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SPORTS LAW
Should the NCAA's Eligibility Rules
Be Subjected To The Sherman Antitrust Act?
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a large business
capable of generating millions of dollars. In 1989, the NCAA's basketball
tournament generated over $70 million.' Each of the 64 schools qualifying for
the tournament received direct payments of $275,000.2 Football programs were
also successful with bowl games generating upwards of $60 million.3 Yet for as
much revenue college athletics can generate for each educational institution, the
NCAA has been successful at classifying itself as a non-profit, non-competitive
entity and has managed to shelter itself from direct scrutiny of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Although the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. NCAA4
concluded that determining television contracts was an NCAA action subject to
the Sherman Act, NCAA eligibility rules have thus far avoided such scrutiny. In
essence, the Supreme Court skirted the eligibility issue, only recognizing that the
NCAA rules concerning the issue were not without justification.5 The question
becomes, do the NCAA eligibility/amateur rules prohibiting student-athletes from
receiving compensation not authorized by the NCAA, amount to price fixing
violating the Sherman Act? This article seeks to answer that question.
I. WHO IS THE NCAA?
The NCAA is a private, nonprofit association consisting of over 1000
members of accredited colleges and universities within the boundaries of the
United States of America." These members are divided into various sections
depending upon the size of the institution and its respective emphasis upon
athletics.7
The NCAA, based in Mission, Kansas, operates pursuant to the rules and
regulations set forth in its Constitution and Bylaws The members of the NCAA
convene yearly, generally in January, at the NCAA convention to review rules
and make amendments. These rules are adopted by the members and may be
1. NCAA News, July 19, 1989 at 1, col 4.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 468 U.S. 65 (1984)
5. Id.
6. NCAA News, Aug. 30, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
7. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. 89 (1984).
8. NCAA News, May 24, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
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amended subject to membership approval. All principles of the NCAA are set
forth in a printed manual and sent to each member institution.'
The NCAA was created in 1905 in response to the frightening increase in the
level of violence associated with college football."0 Since then, its responsibili-
ties have grown to include regulation of recruiting, eligibility, financial aid,
negotiating television contracts, and supervision of the conduct of its
members." Yet even with its continuously increasing responsibilities, the
NCAA has always maintained that its basic goal is "to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarca-
tion between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports."' 2
It is not surprising that the NCAA has gone far beyond its original intended
purpose. Presently, it is now the governing body of a large business, the business
of college athletics. With large payouts to schools with successful athletic
programs, competition for star high-school athletes can be intense.'
Unfortunately, due to the high stakes involved, rules and regulations are
frequently sacrificed.
In response to such illegal practices as payments to students or recruiting
violations, the NCAA closely regulates the "courting" of high school athletes. By
maintaining strict recruiting guidelines, the NCAA seeks to regulate the competi-
tion for incoming "laborers." These same rules also regulate these "laborers"
once they reach the collegiate level and dictate what the student-athlete must do
to maintain his or her eligibility. The NCAA rules state that:
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for
intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his or
her athletics skill for pay in any form in that sport; (b) Accepts a promise of
pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate
athletics participation; (c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play
professional athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration
received; (d) Receives, directly or indirectly,a salary, reimbursement of expenses
or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization
based upon athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules
and regulations; (e) Completes on any professional athletics team.., even if no
pay ... was received; or (f) Enters into a professional draft or an agreement
with an agent or other entity to negotiate a professional contract. 4
Via its amateur-status rules, the NCAA limits compensation to tuition, fees,
and room and board, with stringent rules concerning indirect forms of
compensation.
The existence of such restrictions upon the recruitment of student-athletes
the same athletes who will help a college or university gain financial benefits
9. 1993-94 NCAA MANUAL 8 (1993) [hereinafter, NCAA Manual].
10. J. Falla, NCAA: THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 15 (1981).
11. NCAA Manual, supra, note 9 at 7.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Pay to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 206 (1990).
14. NCAA Manual, supra, note 9 at 64.
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through its athletic program - begs the question of whether the NCAA engages
in the unfair restriction of trade? Through the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
Congress of the United States has set forth the policy that trade shall not be
unfairly restricted in this country. 5
However, before going further, some understanding of the Sherman Antitrust
Act is necessary. The Act was enacted in 1890 and was, as the Supreme Court
later stated, "aimed at preserving free unfettered competition as the role of
trade."'
16
The drafters of the Sherman Act had a dual focus in mind. Section I"1 was
geared towards preventing any type of contract that resulted in a restraint of
trade or commerce. Section 2 s made it illegal for a person to monopolize or act
with others to monopolize any part of trade or commerce within the United
States or its foreign partners." The courts have declared certain business trans-
actions as being in restraint of trade. One such example are group boycotts.
"Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have
long been held to be in the forbidden category."' This would include a group
of large department stores refusing to deal with smaller retail stores." Another
type of illegal restraint on trade is a "horizontal restraint." Such restraints are
agreements between competitors at the same level of market structure (generally
agreements to purchase or not purchase goods from particular dealers).' They
are intended to restrain competition at the same level of distribution.'
As time has shown, asserting antitrust claims has been far from easy,
primarily because courts have made the requirements for bringing such claims
difficult. In order to bring a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
claimant must prove three elements: (1) an agreement or conspiracy;
(2) resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade; and, (3) causing "antitrust
injury."'24 Such an injury, to "business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws,"' must be sustained by both the claimant as
well as by the competition in general.'s
Under §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, in order to claim monopolization, a
claimant must show both (1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant
15. 15 U.S.C §I (1890) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.
16. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1959).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 and § 2.
20. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1959).
21. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
22. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1978).
23. Const. Aggregate Transport v. Florida Rock Ind., 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1983).
24. Taggert v. Rutledge, 657 F.Supp. 1420, 1433 (D. Mont. 1987).
25. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1992).
26. Southern Business Com. v. Matsushita Elec., 806 F. Supp. 950, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
1993]
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market, and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."
Thus, with the assumption that college athletics can be a money-making
operation, the question remains: Should the Sherman Antitrust Act be applied to
college athletics?
II. How THE COURTS HAVE VIEWED THE ISSUE OF AMATEURISM TO DATE
Determining whether the NCAA's rules concerning amateur status violate the
Sherman Act has not yielded clear-cut results yet. Although the Sherman Act
prohibits "every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states,"28 it has been recognized that this statement
cannot be applied literally as virtually every contract restrains trade in some
manner, even if between the two parties.29 Thus, the Supreme Court has limited
the Sherman Act to those contracts that limit competition in an unreasonable
manner."0 Unfortunately for those seeking clear direction, the Court has not
specified what acts are considered "unreasonable."
The Court's ruling in NCAA v. Board of Regentsa" did provide some
examples of what types of behavior would not be tolerated. One such example is
a horizontal restraint where competitors agree on the way in which each will
compete against the other.a2 An example of this would be an agreement bet-
ween two equally situated businesses which agree to only do business with one
dealer and not that dealer's competitor.3 Additionally, the Court determined
that placing a limit upon the output of a certain product was unreasonable as it
created an artificially limited product. 4 Thus horizontal restraints and output
limitations are two examples of what the Supreme Court would deem as "unrea-
sonable" limits on competition.
In applying this to the NCAA regulations, the NCAA has for all intents and
purposes engaged in horizontal restraints. By making it illegal for universities
and colleges to provide student-athletes with little more than tuition and
room/board, the NCAA has managed to set a horizontal restraint upon athletes.
Because the NCAA has limited the compensation a university may pay its
athletes, there is an "across-the-board" limitation on the fair market value of
these athletes. This is true regardless of how valuable an athlete may be to the
university's athletic program. By having an agreement between all NCAA
members NOT to provide student-athletes with what may be their market value,
the NCAA has restrained trade.
27. Id. at 959.
28. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1988).
29. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
30. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 99.
33. Const. Aggregate Transport v. Florida Rock Ind., 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1983).
34. Id.
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What needs to be addressed is whether the Sherman Act should apply to the
NCAA's regulations imposed upon amateurs. Prior case law has not dealt with
the issue directly, instead choosing to apply the Supreme Court's discussion of
the matter in dictum. In NCAA v. Board of Regents," the Universities of Okla-
homa and Georgia challenged the NCAA's regulations concerning televising
college football games. The NCAA controlled all negotiations with networks
regarding televising games, forcing all members to comply with any agreement
made between the NCAA and any network. Included in the NCAA's rules was a
limitation upon the number of television appearances each team could have.'
Both universities challenged the restrictions forbidding individual universities
from negotiating independently with television networks, claiming that the
NCAA restricted trade in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the lower court's conclusion that NCAA rules were in
violation of the Sherman Act, concluded that the agreement restricted output and
affected price." The NCAA attempted to make an argument that the TV plan
actually helped trade in that it assisted in the marketing of broadcast rights and
was therefore pro-competitive." However, the Court refused to accept this
claiming that the NCAA limit on the number of televised games each school
could have served as an artificial restraint on both consumers and
broadcasters.39
Of importance to later cases concerning the legality of NCAA amateur
restrictions, the Supreme Court did not decide the matter of the legality of the
NCAA's amateur rules directly, instead concluding that restraints concerning a
student-athletes eligibility and amateur status were reasonable and necessary to
"preserve the character and quality of the 'product.""'4 The Court believed that
in order to protect the integrity of college athletics, the NCAA had to be allowed
to establish mutual agreement between the various collegiate institutions.4' Such
rules were a necessary means of reaching the valid ends of maintaining
"amateurism." Therefore, because the Supreme Court merely dealt with the
amateur issue in dictum, it has yet to receive the highest court's full attention
and analysis.
Subsequent cases have not clarified the antitrust analysis of the NCAA's
amateur rules any further. In McCormack v. NCAA,42 the court relied upon the
reasoning in Board of Regents in concluding that NCAA sanctions suspending an
athletic program was a reasonable exercise of its police powers.43 In
McCormack, a member of the Southern Methodist University football program
35. 468 U.S. 85.
36. Id. at 92-93.
37. Id. at 113.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 99.
40. Id. at 102.
41. Id.
42. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
43. Id.
19931
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sued the NCAA claiming that its suspension of the football program for
recruiting violations conflicted with the Sherman Antitrust Act. The player
claimed the suspension amounted to an illegal group boycott by way of denying
all student-athletes involved with the football program a chance to compete. It
was his belief that because the NCAA suspended the football program, it had in
essence boycotted SMU's football team." After amending his complaint to
include other football player and cheerleaders as co-plaintiffs, the plaintiff took
the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that because the eligibility rules of the NCAA were lawful means of
maintaining the integrity of college athletics, the means of enforcing the rules
were also lawful and thus the suspension did not constitute an illegal boycott.
In United States v. Walters,4" two sports agents were charged with secretly
paying college athletes to sign representation contracts, thereby violating NCAA
Bylaw 12.3.1.46 In their defense, both agents charged the NCAA eligibility rules
with being contrary to the Sherman Act by denying student-athletes compensa-
tion for their athletic services and sought to have the charges dismissed. Relying
on both Board of Regents and McCormack, the Walters court rejected such
claims and reaffirmed the conclusion that the NCAA's restrictions on eligibility
are shielded from the Sherman Act.
In Gaines v. NCAA,47 Bradford Gaines, then a junior at Vanderbilt Universi-
ty, declared himself eligible for the 1990 National Football League draft follow-
ing the 1989 college football season. The NFL required underclassmen who
intended on entering the draft to waive their final year of eligibility.4 Addition-
ally, Gaines consulted a sports agent (though not receiving or providing any
compensation) and entered the NFL's scouting combine. After proceeding
through the draft unclaimed and after a fruitless attempt to sign a free agent
contract, Gaines attempted to re-enter Vanderbilt University and reclaim his
eligibility.49
The NCAA, invoking its "no agent"'  and "no draft"' rules, refused to
44. Id.
45. United States v. Walters, 711 F.Supp 1435 (N.D. II1. 1989).
46. See, note 50, infra.
47. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F.Supp 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
48. Id. at 740.
49. Id. at 741.
50. NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1 provides:
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an inter-collegiate sport if he or she
ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletic ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an agency contract
not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall be deemed applicable
to all sports and the individual shall be ineligible to participate in all sports.
51. NCAA Bylaw 12.2.4.2 provides:
An individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the individual asks to be
placed on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a professional league in that sport
even though:
(a) the individual asks that his or her name be withdrawn from the draft list
[Vol. IV: 113
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reinstate Gaines' final year of eligibility. Gaines filed a suit seeking an injunction
theorizing that the NCAA rules violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. The court
concluded that the Sherman Act was not expansive enough to cover non-
economic activities such as determining amateur status and that even if it did, the
NCAA would be sheltered because of its goal of preserving amateurism in
college. The court concluded that the NCAA did not willfully establish itself as a
monopoly and that Gaines had no basis for relief.52
In Banks v. NCAA, 3 a case whose facts were identical to Gaines until
reaching the court, Braxton Banks also sued the NCAA concerning his eligibility
status.' However, unlike Bradford Gaines, Banks brought suit under section 1
of the Sherman Act in federal district court in the Northern District of Indiana
claiming that the NCAA rules were an unfair restraint of trade.
The court in Banks, contrary to the Gaines court, relied upon NCAA v. Board
of Regents in concluding that the Sherman Act did apply to the NCAA.55
Although the Supreme Court in Board of Regents primarily addressed the
NCAA's television rules, the court in Banks extended the Supreme Court's
rationale to the NCAA eligibility rules.' However, the court concluded that the
NCAA rules were reasonably related to their goal preserving amateurism, not
over-broad, did not display anti-competitive effects, and that Banks did not show
a reasonable likelihood of showing a significant harm to consumer welfare.57
Thus, Banks also failed in his attempt at injunctive relief.5"
III. RULE OF REASON V. PER SE RULE
Because every contract can in someway be stretched to be interpreted as
restraining trade, the Sherman Act has been narrowed to only proscribe
"unreasonable restraints." '59 In subjecting particular conduct to the Sherman Act,
it is first necessary to determine the appropriate test for legality to apply to the
conduct, either the per se rule of illegality or the rule of reason analysis.'
The per se doctrine is applied to that type of conduct that is substantially
injurious to competition and generally includes price fixing (establishing a pre-set
price regardless of market value), group boycotts and resale price
prior to the actual draft,
(b) the individual's name remains on the list but he or she is not drafted, or
(c) the individual is drafted but does not sign an agreement with any profes-
sional athletics team.
52. Id. at 747.
53. 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
54. Id. at 855.
55. Id. at 857.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 861.
58. Id.
59. Cha-Car v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 752 F.2d 609, 612 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
60. Wendy T. Kirby and T. Clark Weymouth. Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role of
Noneconomic Values, 61 IND. L. J. 31, 33 (1985).
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maintenance.61 The Supreme Court has declared "per se" illegal those restraints
which have a "pernicious effect on competition and lack ... any redeeming
virtue ... without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused."'62
In such cases, the court will apply the per se rule and automatically deem the
conduct illegal.
Unfortunately, such decisions are rarely clear-cut and cannot be so easily
classified. When the conduct is questionable, courts often apply the "rule of
reason" analysis whereby the courts "examine the challenged conduct to
determine its purpose and likely effects on competition. They then balance the
conduct's pro- and anti-competitive effects to determine it legality.
' 63
Essentially, this means that certain activity may appear to be against free trade
and commerce, but should the activity also have the weightier effect of
encouraging competition, it will be allowed.
Because the per se doctrine determines legality on a black and white basis,
courts have been less willing to apply the rule and instead have allowed for
exceptions to the rule if the court believes the restrictive rules are geared to a
legitimate purpose.'
Plaintiffs suing the NCAA on antitrust grounds have argued for the
application of the per se rule, claiming that the NCAA has eliminated all forms
of price competition for student-athletes, thereby fixing the market value of these
athletes.65 However, the Supreme Court has concluded that the NCAA has a
legitimate enough goal in promoting amateur athletics to warrant applying the
more ad hoc analysis of the rule of reason analysis.' However, it must be noted
that merely applying the rule of reason test does not save the NCAA. A determi-
nation that the NCAA rules result in a weightier anti-competitive effect would
warrant invalidating the rules.6'
IV. SHOULD THE NCAA BE SUBJECTED TO ANTITRUST REGULATIONS?
The question that still stands unanswered by the Supreme Court today is
whether the NCAA's eligibility rules violate the Sherman Act in that they
effectively set restrictions upon the amount of compensation payable to a
student-athlete, often far below his or her market value.
Justification for maintaining the NCAA's exemption from the Sherman Act is
evident in caselaw. In addition to those cases set forth above as examples, other
cases display the judicial system's unwillingness to consider the NCAA as a true
"business."
In Jones v. NCAA,65 the NCAA's reviewing board determined that a student
61. Const. Aggregate Transport, 710 F.2d at 772.
62. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
63. Id. at 34.
64. Id.
65. See, supra note 13, at 219.
66. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104.
67. Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 859.
68. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
[Vol. IV: 113
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who received compensation for two seasons when he was not enrolled in college
was not allowed to return to college and maintain eligibility, reasoning that to
grant eligibility would be contrary to the NCAA's goal of recognizing "amateur"
standing in athletics.69 The NCAA's decision was reviewed in a Massachusetts
district court which upheld the ruling, concluding that the Sherman Act did not
apply to eligibility standards as the Act was aimed at associations with
commercial objectives and applied to non-profit organizations in limited
situations." That court also noted that Jones failed to show how the eligibility
requirements were connected to any commercial or business activities that
involved him."' The district court concluded the NCAA was entitled to limit
access to intercollegiate sports in its attempt to reach the legitimate end of
maintaining the amateur status of collegiate sports.72
Support based upon similar findings came from the Arizona district court in
Justice v. NCAA,73 where that court refused to apply the per se analysis to the
NCAA rules. It was the court's contention that per se analysis was limited to
those circumstances where "the exclusionary or coercive conduct is a direct
affront to competition, or a 'naked restraint' rather than action that merely had
an incidental effect upon competition."'74 In Justice, the University of Arizona
was suspended from post-season play as a result of NCAA rules violations. The
court reasoned that such a suspension lacked an anti-competitive purpose and
was merely a means to the enforcement of the NCAA goal of preserving
amateurism.75
It is apparent from the reasoning in these cases that courts, to this point, have
been willing to give great deference to the NCAA. Because it has buttressed its
position with the contention of furthering "amateurism," the NCAA has been
relatively untouched by the Sherman Act with reference to its eligibility rules.
However, the court's decision in Banks, indicates the NCAA may no longer be
untouchable. With that case, it appears that courts may no longer be hesitant to
subject a noncommercial entity's rules to the Sherman Act, regardless of the
legitimacy of its goals.
Should the courts follow through on their seeming willingness to stop
shielding the NCAA, it would be an action that is long overdue. Regardless if
these courts refuse to apply the "per se" rule, even under the "rule of reason,"
the NCAA regulations seem to weigh more towards anti-competitive behavior
than pro-competitive behavior.76
The NCAA's rules concerning eligibility requirements have an anti-
competitive effect in that the prohibition upon student-athletes from testing
69. Id.
70. Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 295.
71. Id. at 303.
72. Id. at 304.
73. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
74. Id. at 379.
75. Id. at 382.
76. Goldman, supra note 13, at 206, 225.
1993]
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professional drafts denies the athlete from attaining his or her market value.77
However, the Court's dicta in NCAA v. Board of Regents has indicated the
general notion that these anti-competitive effects are a necessary evil in hopes of
distinguishing college and professional athletics."
Such arguments must be placed in perspective when considering that in the
spirit of preserving amateurism, the NCAA has established itself as quite a
cartel. The NCAA has virtually done away with price competition among its
members. 9 Through its rules, it has guaranteed that compensation to student-
athletes is at a particular level and cannot be supplemented through indirect
means.
80
There has been debate as to whether the Sherman Act requires a plaintiff to
establish a nexus between the challenged restraint and interstate commerce or
merely an effect on commerce from the defendant's general business.8 Because
the NCAA engages in nationwide recruiting and enters into television contracts
whereby contests are broadcast nationwide and because tickets to such events are
sold throughout the country, there is an obvious affect upon interstate commerce
and thus this question is moot.'
Traditionally, the NCAA has sought exemption from antitrust litigation by
claiming itself to be a non-profit organization pursuing non-commercial purposes.
They have cited to cases such as Marjorie Webster College v. Middle States
Association,3 where the court there concluded that the Sherman Act was not
meant for non-commercial groups and learned professions. Although this case
does not actually deal with the NCAA, the NCAA has analogized itself as being
a non-profit, non-commercial group.
However, reliance upon such cases became invalid after the Supreme Court
decided Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.' There, the Court, addressing a bar
association's minimum fee schedule, concluded broadly that the Sherman Act
applied to restraints used by non-profit regulatory groups in general.'
Regardless of the Goldfarb decision, the NCAA may attempt to claim
exemption by arguing that such cases as Missouri v. National Organization for
Women," and Henry v. First National Bank," apply to NCAA. In Missouri v.
NOW, the defendant's campaign for a convention boycott of states that had not
ratified the Equal Rights Amendment was not subjected to the Sherman Antitrust
77. Paul B. McCarthy and Michael Kettle, An End Run Around The Sherman Act? Banks v.
NCAA and Gaines v. NCAA, 19 J. OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 295 (1992).
78. 468 U.S. 65 (1984).
79. Goldman, supra note 13, at 210.
80. Id.
81. Compare, Western Waste Sev. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (9th
Cir. 1980), with Furlong v. Long Island College Hospital., 710 F.2d 922, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1983).
82. Goldman, supra note 13, at 215.
83. 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
84. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
85. Goldman, supra note 13, at 216.
86. 620 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th Cir. 1980).
87. 595 F.2d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Act. In Henry v. First National Bank, the civil rights boycott of business'
discriminating based upon race was determined to be beyond the Sherman Act.
However, these cases can be distinguished from the NCAA in that those were
non-commercial groups asserting First Amendment claims. Here, the NCAA is
clearly a commercial entity with its revenue-aimed athletic programs.8 The
NCAA seeks to constantly improve and market its athletic programs resulting in
an athletic budget in the millions of dollars." Even the Supreme Court has
accepted that the NCAA and its members are organized to reach the maximum
profits."
It would seem that the Supreme Court did not provide the NCAA with
blanket protection in its decision in Board of Regents where it labeled the
NCAA's eligibility rules as "reasonable." Because the NCAA eligibility rules
affect interstate commerce and because the NCAA no longer receives blanket
immunity, the restraints on eligibility should be subjected to the Sherman
Antitrust Act.9
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents allows for NCAA rules to be viewed
under the "rule of reason" test. However it would seem that the Court applied
the test incorrectly.92 In Board of Regents, the Court inferred that an NCAA
rule will withstand antitrust challenges if it is "tailored to the goal" of
maintaining the "product" of college sports in the economic marketplace. 93
However, the Court defers to the NCAA's own definition of what its goals and
intentions are. 4 This allows the NCAA to claim that any marketing of its prod-
uct is merely done in order to maintain its product. This leaves the rule of reason
analysis of amateurism rules without any bite.95
Under the Board of Regents analysis, the NCAA rules should fail. The
Supreme Court there stated that "when there is an agreement not to compete in
terms of price or output, no elaborate ... analysis is required to demonstrate the
anti-competitive character of such an agreement."' Applying this to the eligi-
bility requirements, it seems that by affecting the compensation paid to student-
athletes, a presumption of anti-competitive behavior is acceptable.97
The NCAA's contention thatthe "no draft" and "no agent" rules are necessary
to maintain the product of college sports, is also meritless because the NCAA
rules themselves do not prohibit contact with agents and professional teams.
College hockey and baseball players, although subjected to the same NCAA
rules as other student-athletes, are allowed to be drafted by professional teams
88. Goldman, supra note 13, at 216.
89. Id.
90. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-101.
91. Id.
92. Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1299
(1992)
93. Board of Regents. 468 U.S. at 119.
94. Note, supra note 92, at 1308.
95. Id.
96. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109.
97. Note, supra note 92, at 1310.
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and still maintain their eligibility as long as they do not accept payment.98 If the
NCAA allows some of its athletes to have contact with professional teams, it
cannot claim that such contact taints a student-athlete's amateur status.99
Finally, the NCAA's claims that limited compensation for athletes is
necessary to further the goal of promoting intercollegiate athletics. However, one
needs only to look at the recent number of rule violations consisting of illegal
payments to student-athletes to conclude otherwise. It appears that by limiting
compensation, student-athletes and athletic programs are finding alternative
methods of rewarding athletes, usually under the table." °
V. CONCLUSION
The NCAA has successfully hidden the wolf of price-fixing and other anti-
competitive conduct within the sheep's clothing known as amateurism. The
NCAA is clearly no longer simply the regulating body of college athletics but
has become a lucrative business. With sports drawing large crowds and television
contracts to promote the game, educational bodies have fully realized the power
of college athletics. Yet, under the guise of maintaining amateurism, the NCAA
has set a limit to the compensation a student-athlete can receive while the gains
to the institution seem limitless. Such amateur restrictions deprive the athlete of
his or her fair market value. The judicial system has taken steps towards piercing
the wolf's disguise by subjecting eligibility rules to the Sherman Act. It is now a
matter of time before the rule of reason test does justice to its name and forces
the NCAA to rethink its eligibility requirements.
Asim S. Raza
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1989, at 25, col. 5; N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1981 at 2S. col. 1.
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